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Dr Metka Potocnik* 
 
Feminist jurisprudence is unfortunately not an extensively studied subject in law courses 
in the United Kingdom. Most researchers with extensive careers would struggle with 
clearly explaining the key schools of thought, authors or concepts in feminist 
jurisprudence. Arguably, however, all areas of law would greatly benefit from a feminist 
investigation. This is true for areas, which expressly deal with women issues, but equally 
important in areas of law, which are written as “gender-neutral.” To dispel some of the 
mystery around feminist jurisprudence, 1  Edward Elgar has published a much-needed 
collection of expert views on feminist jurisprudence. Although most contributions offer 
the United States’ perspective, this research handbook’s rich spread of twenty-six chapters 
(including the Introduction), represents a welcome addition to jurisprudential literature.2 
At the start Robin West introduces this research handbook with a clear and easily 
accessible overview of feminist legal theory, starting with the two opposite views: liberal 
legal feminism and radical feminist legal theory.3 The two competing approaches and their 
theoretical differences eventually opened the space for further development of plurality of 
theoretical approaches (relational feminism; vulnerability theory; intersectional 
feminism(s); postmodern, queer; sex-radical and sex-positive feminism; or socialist 
feminism). It is apparent that feminist legal thought will persist, “as long as [women’s] 
subordination itself persists as a widespread and diminishing force in women’s and girls’ 
lives.”4 Plurality of feminist theory is explored in contributions on the varieties of feminist 
legal theory (Part I);5 the interface between feminist legal theory and criminal law (Part 
II);6 or reproductive rights (Part III);7 the interrelationship among feminist legal theory, 
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1 Robin West and Cynthia Grant Bowman (eds), Research Handbook on Feminist Jurisprudence (Edward Elgar, 
2019) (West and Grant Bowman). The other research handbook is: Susan Harris Rimmer and Kate Ogg 
(eds), Research handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). 
2 There have been several contributions on feminist jurisprudence (for example: Hilaire Barnett, Introduction 
to Feminist Jurisprudence (Cavendish Publishing, 1998)); although often textbooks on jurisprudence include 
only limited chapters on feminist jurisprudence (for example Chapter 15 (out of 18 chapters in total) in MDA 
Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008); this continues in a subsequent 
edition, Chapter 14 (out of 19 chapters in total), with some contributions other chapters on justice and critical 
race theory in MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014)). Feminist 
jurisprudence is included as a singular chapter in a useful, yet broader handbook on feminist theory: Lisa 
Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
3 Robin West, ‘Introduction to the Research Handbook on Feminist Jurisprudence,’ pp 1-22. 
4 West (n3) 22. 
5 There are eight contributions in Part I: (1) Sylvia A Law, ‘In defense of liberal feminism,’ pp 24-43; (2) 
Chao-ju Chen, ‘Catharine A. MacKinnon and equality theory,’ pp 44-64; (3) Robin West, ‘Relational 
feminism and law,’ pp 65-72; (4) Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The limits of equality: vulnerability and 
inevitable inequality,’ pp 73-90; (5) Cynthia Grant Bowman, ‘Socialist feminist legal theory: a plea,’ pp 91-
111; (6) Dorothy E Roberts, ‘Critical race feminism,’ pp. 112-126; (7) Laura A Rosenbury, ‘Postmodern 
feminist legal theory,’ pp 127-137; (8) Nan D Hunter, ‘Feminism, sexuality and the law,’ pp 138-164. 
6 Four contributions in Part II: (1) Deborah Tuerkheimer, ‘Sexual agency and the unfinished work of rape 
law reform,’ pp. 166-183; (2) Nivedita Menon, ‘Sexual violence and the law in India,’ pp 184-212; (3) Victoria 
Nourse, ‘Violence against women and liberal sexism,’ pp 213-230; (4) Ngaire Naffine, ‘‘Some gentle violence’: 
marital rape immunity as contradiction in criminal law,’ pp 231-247. 
7 Two contributions in Part III: (1) Lisa C Ikemoto, ‘Reproductive rights and justice: a multiple feminist 
theories account,’ pp 249-263; (2) Noya Rimalt, ‘Against Roe exceptionalism: degendering abortion,’ pp 264-
282. 
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sex discrimination and sexual harassment (Part IV);8 select perspectives on constitutional 
law (Part V);9 or private law (Part VI);10 and finally, the views of feminist legal theory on 
international law (Part VII).11 
 
Part I contains a useful introduction to the diversity of feminist theory and is particularly 
insightful for a novice reader in this area. Sylvia A. Law draws on the US context in which 
she offers a detailed description and defence of liberal feminism, in times when both 
liberalism and feminism are under constant attacks.12 Law explores in detail examples of 
backlash against liberal feminism in the US since 2016, including reproductive health care 
for women; sexual harassment law; and economic inequality of women. Chao-ju Chen offers 
an insight to Catharine A. MacKinnon’s “momentous contributions to feminist theory”13 
with her theory of equality and sexuality as a theory of power in the early 1980s. This 
overview is particularly helpful to the inexperienced reader of feminist jurisprudence. In 
her second individual contribution to this research handbook Robin West explores relational 
legal feminism, as a response to the problems or dilemmas with liberal feminism, which is 
based on formal equality. Continuing on the topic of equality Martha Albertson Fineman 
advocates for an approach based on the vulnerability theory according to which “the state 
must be responsive to the realities of human vulnerability and its corollary social 
dependency, as well as to situations reflecting inherent or necessary inequality, when it 
initially establishes or sets up mechanisms to monitor these relationships and 
institutions.”14  
Next, Cynthia Grant Bowman, after many years in the field, returns to socialist 
feminist theory. Grant Bowman finds other feminist theories useful to a degree, but 
ultimately inadequate in explaining “the deeper structures that are responsible for the 
persistence of male dominance”15 and feminist legal theory, which is grounded in theory 
of socialist feminism can cure this deficiency, with its “insights about the interdependence 
of capitalism and patriarchy” resultingly offering “a foundation upon which to construct 
campaigns for lasting change.”16 Turning her attention to another key feminist theory, 
Dorothy E. Roberts explores critical race feminism, its historical developments, state 
regulation of black women’s bodies and the intersection of legal institutions that operate 
in conjunction to marginalize black women. In response Roberts offers two frameworks to 
“resist women’s subordination – reproductive justice and anti-carceral approaches to 
domestic violence.” 17  Laura A. Rosenbury gives a brief overview of the history and 
application of the postmodern feminist legal theory and advocates for an affirmative 
 
8 Three contributions in Part IV: (1) Kimberly A Yuracko, ‘Sexual harassment law: an evolution in theory, 
scope and impact,’ pp 284-302; (2) Orit Kamir, ‘A dignitarian feminist jurisprudence with application to rape, 
sexual harassment and honor codes,’ pp 303-320; (3) Katharine K Baker, ‘Sex equality, gender injury, Title 
IX and women’s education,’ pp 321-341. 
9 Two contributions in Part V: (1) Julie A Nice, ‘The gendered jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ 
pp 343-365; (2) Mary Anne Franks, ‘Beyond ‘Free Speech for the White Man’: feminism and the First 
Amendment,’ pp 366-384. 
10 Four contributions in Part VI: (1) Martha Chamallas, ‘Feminist legal theory and tort law,’ pp 386-405; (2) 
Hila Keren, ‘Feminism and contract law,’ pp 406-425; (3) Susan Frelich Appleton, ‘How feminism remade 
American family law (and how it did not),’ pp 426-445; (4) Julie C Suk, ‘Feminism and family leave,’ pp 446-
466. 
11 Two contributions in Part VII: (1) Adrien K Wing, ‘International law and feminism,’ pp 468-484; and (2) 
Irem Çaglar and Berna Akçali Gür, ‘The state’s due diligence obligation,’ pp 485-502. 
12 Law (n5) 30. 
13 Chen (n5) 44. 
14 Albertson Fineman (n5) 73. 
15 Grant Bowman (n5) 91. 
16 Grant Bowman (n5) 91. 
17 Roberts (n5) 114. 
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conception of this theory, arguing against a reductionist view of it, in that it has “much 
more to offer than mere critiques of other theories.”18 In the concluding chapter in Part 
I, Nan D. Hunter “offers a guide to the sexuality debates within feminism, specifically as 
they affected and were affected by the law.”19 
 
Part II focuses on the application of feminist legal theory in criminal law. To start, Deborah 
Tuerkheimer discusses the developments in rape law, which is a story of progress, even if 
incomplete.20 Based on historical exploration and feminist theory, Tuerkheimer argues that 
modern rape law should be based on the promotion of female sexual agency (contrary to 
the majority autonomy justification).21 Turning to the evidence and context on sexual 
violence and the law in India, Nivedita Menon offers an overview of the heterogenous and 
contentious space of Indian feminism and demonstrates the need to move the feminist 
political task beyond the state-led transformations.22 In light of the many faults of the law, 
Menon suggests that in sexual harassment cases “the possibility of justice is greater when 
small work-based communities hammer out acceptable norms of behaviour and 
punishment that are appropriate to it. More importantly, such a self-constituting 
community is more likely to be active and to constitute itself anew constantly, thus 
resulting in suitable amendments in the policy from time to time.” 23  Victoria Nourse 
discusses the history of the US Violence Against Women Act,24 with the aim to “better 
understand the forces that shaped [] opposition [to the Act], as set of background norms 
[which Nourse] theorize[s] as ‘liberal sexism,’”25 according to which “women’s rights are 
not worthy in themselves, for women, women of all colours and orientations; they are only 
a means to an end.”26 To conclude Part II, Ngaire Naffine explores marital rape immunity 
as the contradiction in criminal law, which has been “obfuscated and deflected by the 
mainstream scholars.”27 
 
Next, authors in Part III explore the interface between feminist legal theory and 
reproductive rights. From the US perspective, Lisa C Ikemoto investigates the relationship 
between feminist jurisprudence, the law, politics and justice, highlighting issues well 
beyond abortion. At present, the abortion struggle has been reductive and Ikemoto argues 
that there should be a prioritisation on other issues, such as surrogacy, coerced sterilization, 
welfare family caps and criminal prosecution of pregnant women.28 More broadly Ikemoto 
argues that a multi-theory approach to issues of reproductive rights and justice is preferable 
to the use of a single feminist theory.29 Arguing against Roe30 exceptionalism, Noya Rimalt 
examines the finer detail of the conceptualization of the right to abortion as a privacy right 
in the US and concludes, that “women’s best bet for moving forward might well be 
reconceptualization of abortion as ungendered, unisex right which measures abortion 
rights against well-established (male) legal protections.”31 
 
18 Rosenbury (n5) 127. 
19 Hunter (n5) 139. 
20 Tuerkheimer (n6) 166. 
21 Tuerkheimer (n6) 167. 
22 Menon (n6) 186. 
23 Menon (n6) 212. 
24 1994, Pub L No 102-322, tit IV, 108 Stat 1902 (codified as amended in several sections of 8, 18, 28 and 
42 USC). 
25 Nourse (n6) 213. 
26 Nourse (n6) 229. 
27 Naffine (n6) 231. 
28 Ikemoto (n7) 249-250. 
29 Ikemoto (n7) 251. 
30 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
31 Rimalt (n7) 265. 
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In Part IV, writers explore the relationship among feminist theory, sex discrimination and 
sexual harassment. Opening this part, Kimberly A. Yuracko pictures the evolution of sexual 
harassment law in the US “in both legal and practical terms,”32 which offers a helpful start 
to the discussion for a novice reader. Orit Kamir points to an academic research gap in that 
feminists have not engaged sufficiently with the concept of human dignity. In response, 
Kamir offers feminism, which is based both on dignity and respect.33 Explaining the here 
proposed concept of ‘dignitarian feminism’ and applying it to the context of Israel’s 
patriarchal culture, Kamir observes that it “includes the dignity-and-respect-based critique 
of honor patterns.” 34  Katharine K. Baker addresses the issue of equal education 
opportunities for women, through the examples of single-sex colleges, single-sex sports 
and Title IX of the 1972 Civil Rights Act.35  
 
Turning to issues of constitutional law in Part V, Julie A. Nice explores the convergence of 
feminist jurisprudence and the US Fourteenth Amendment in their pursuit of equality and 
liberty. Finding that constitutional law is not the self-sufficient solution, Nice observes that 
“feminists have always understood constitutional law as a language and the courts as a 
forum for the dialogue necessary to end the subordination of women.”36 Mary Anne Franks 
continues the discussion on the relationship between feminist theory and constitutional 
law by exploring the First Amendment. She tackles the interesting, if thorny issue of 
whether revenge porn is free speech, protected under the Constitution. Through the 
history and evolution of this area, Franks concludes that “[f]reedom of speech for women 
is an unfinished project, not a completed fact, and achieving free speech will require a 
corrective, not merely protective, approach.” Relying on Kimberlé Crenshaw’s theory, 
Franks posits “[w]hen women have free speech, we all have free speech.”37 
 
On a topic, which is not often seen as an obvious area for feminist scholars (at least to lay 
persons), because of its apparently “gender-neutral” position, Part VI focuses on the 
intersection between feminist theory and private law. This is one of the sections of the 
book that every lawyer, student or academic will be familiar with – at least from the law 
perspective. Martha Chamallas engages with the long line of feminist critics of tort law, 
which posits that tort law fails to provide for adequate compensation for injuries, which 
disproportionately affect women. Although contemporary tort law is gender-neutral, 
Chamallas offers a clear presentation of the “implicit male bias in tort law” and concludes 
that “[u]ntil the lack of protection for gender-related torts and the use of gender-biased 
methods in calculating damages are addressed, women’s lives, activities and potential will 
continue to be worth less in the eyes of the law, even though formal tort doctrine is gender 
neutral.”38 Turning to contract law Hila Keren highlights the need for engaging with feminist 
critique of this old discipline, in that “a feminist critique is indispensable for a better 
future.”39 This need for a feminist insight reaches well beyond merely the obvious choice 
 
32 Yuracko (n8) 285. 
33 Kamir (n8) 304. 
34 Kamir (n8) 304. 
35 “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any educational programs or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance.” 20 USC §1681 (2012). 
36 Nice (n9) 365). 
37 Franks (n9) 384 (referring to Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics (1989) U Chi Legal F 139, 
167). 
38 Chamallas (n10) 387. 
39 Keren (n10) 407. 
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of contracts that involve the intimate sphere of contracting parties (surrogacy agreements, 
cohabitation agreements or divorce settlements). It is imperative that even the “seemingly 
neutral contractual doctrines”40 be discussed, and resultingly the underlying principles and 
foundations underpinning contract law. 
Specifically, on the interface between feminist theory and family law Susan Frelich 
Appleton explores the evolution of US family law through feminist jurisprudence and finds 
that “feminist interventions have helped to bring about groundbreaking shifts [] while still 
leaving ample work for feminists to accomplish”41 in the future. As in the past, family law 
will continue to attract research attention from feminist scholars. Last to conclude Part 
VI, Julie C Suk explores the feminist approach to family leave from the US and the 
European perspectives. With great disparities between the law and practice still abundant, 
“gender justice in the workplace will require a gender-equal distribution of parenting 
duties.”42 
 
Closing the research handbook, Part VII briefly explores the interface between feminist 
legal theory and international law. Whereas a welcome addition here for a more complete 
array of feminist jurisprudence, readers wishing to focus specifically on international law, 
may wish to add other titles on their reading list.43 Adrien K Wing criticizes the US narrow 
respect for and understanding of international law and sees that spilling over to the 
feminist considerations of international law. Wing therefore calls for “[i]n the future, it 
would be significant if US feminists extended their coverage or at least cited more fully to 
the robust international literature.” 44  Although trends like TWAIL45  and CRF46  have 
advanced the complexities of the understanding of international law, much work is to be 
done still.47 In a joint contribution, Irem Çaglar and Berna Akçali Gür highlight developments 
in international human rights law, which in their view would not have been possible, had 
it not been for “feminist theory and global feminist activism.”48 They explore the state’s 
due diligence obligation, through the lens of Opuz v Turkey,49 in which the European Court 
of Human Rights for the first time found that “a state’s failure to address domestic violence 
was held to constitute a form of gender-based discrimination.”50 
 
Overall, this is a highly recommended research handbook of interest to both experts and 
researchers new to feminist jurisprudence. Although the contributions are mostly 
presenting the law and perspectives from the United States, the overview of feminist 
engagement with different areas of the law is impressive, and importantly demonstrates 
that even areas of law, which are written as “gender-neutral” norms (private law), can 
benefit substantially from a feminist approach. 
 
40 Keren (n10) 408. 
41 Frelich Appleton (n10) 426-427. 
42 Suk (n10) 466. 
43 A recent title on this: Susan Harris Rimmer and Kate Ogg (eds), Research handbook on Feminist Engagement 
with International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). The book is reviewed in the same issue of 
Wolverhampton Law Journal, as the present research handbook. Also, Gina Heathcote, Feminist Dialogues on 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
44 Wing (n11) 468. 
45 Third World Approaches to International Law. 
46 Critical race feminism. 
47 Wing (n11) 484. 
48 Çaglar and Gür (n11) 502. 
49 Opuz v Turkey, 2009-III Eur Ct HR 107. 
50 Çaglar and Gür (n11) 485. 
